The current reform objective of developing more competitive workplaces has been incorrectly identified with an alleged 'need' to 'deregulate' the labour market. An examination of current reform proposals reveals that there is an attempt to increase the importance of internal modes of regulation controlled by managers at the expense of external regulation such as awards. Such a development is likely to increase inefficiency and inequality in the labour market, as formal, external modes of regulation can promote both international competitiveness and fairness. Greater attention should be devoted to identifying better ways of linking external and internal modes of regulation to improve both efficiency and equity at work.
The movement to fundamentally reform Australia's industrial relations system has become more vocal, well organized and influential since the mid-1980s. While the outcome of this process is yet to emerge, it is now clear that basic changes in Australia's industrial relations system will occur.
Driving recent calls for industrial relations reform has been a recognition by the major industrial parties that if Australian industry is to become more internationally competitive, workplaces will have to become more efficient and productive. It has, been argued that to achieve this industrial relations institutions should be restructured (Blandy et al., 1986 ). The problems of low productivity levels and inefficiency, it is often asserted, are caused by strict demarcation of duties prescribed in award job classifications and work practices that restrict managers' ability to use human and capital resources efficiently. In addition the insensitivity of the wage fixing system to the needs of individual enterprises has been singled out for special attention (Brown & Rowe, 1986 ). These problems, it is claimed, arise from our industrial relations institutions: the structure of unions, the industrial tribunals and the plethora of industrial regulations and laws that limit employers' ability to organize the means of production as they see fit. It is argued that many of these rules and regulations should be reduced if the objectives of labour market reform are to be achieved. According to some advocates of industrial relations reform, efficiency can only be improved if the shackles of regulation are abolished, or at least greatly reduced, and replaced with rules that are prescribed by management or management in consultation with employees or unions. This reform position is widely known as the movement for labour market deregulation.
Casting the debate as a choice between a 'regulated' or 'deregulated' labour market, however, is misleading. Those Throughout this paper we refer to both 'equity' and 'efficiency' as objectives to be promoted by labour market regulation. These terms are widely used, but their meaning is often unclear. Orthodox economists often argue that efficiency and equity issues should be treated separately: first improve economic performance and then decide how to distribute the benefits. It is alleged that, unless the two policy objectives are kept distinct, efficiency is compromised, which in turn limits the resources available for distribution (Rees, Rodley & Stilwell, 1993, p. 
9).
We do not share this view. Production and distribution issues are often intimately related. For example, we believe that the hallmark of an efficient economy is one that operates at a full employment level of capacity utilization. Less than full employment means that labour and capital resources are not used to their full potential. In this way high levels of unemployment are not just unfair, they are also inefficient (Pasinetti, 1981, pp. 148-50) . At the micro level a longstanding literature has explored the importance of workers' perceptions of fairness for their productive efficiency on the job (Jacques, 1961; Lewin & Peterson, 1988; Brown, 1989; Sheppard, Lewicki & Minton, 1992) . The insights from this and related literature have informed the 'new Keynesian' theory of efficiency wages (see, for example, Groschen, 1991, pp. 369-73) . As Streeck argues, equity does not only refer to 'entitlements for consumption, but [also] to rights of access and utilisation of productive capacities' (Streeck,1991, p. 27 (Sarfati & Kobrin, 1988; Pollert, 1988 Pollert, , 1991 (Willis, 1988, p. 12 (Davis & Lansbury, 1986 (Niland, 1978; Niland, 1989; Angwin & McLaughlin, 1990 (Bray, 1990, p. (Flanders, 1965, p. 10 (Flanders, 1965, pp. 15-18 Clegg, 1990, p. (Atiyha, 1979 (Nevile, 1990; Pusey, 1991) . Many elements of a laissez-faire outlook still inform the common law. This is especially the case with the law of employment and the law of trade unions. (Dabscheck, 1989 (Dabscheck, ,1990 (Berg, Freedman & Freedman, 1978; Rose, 1988 Rose, , 1990 (Piore & Sabel, 1984 (Marsden, 1986; Brown & Nolan, 1988 (Boland, 1992) . External forms of regulation that assist in coordinating wage movements can be important for preventing this problem or minimizing the extent of wage movement when recovery begins. A number of arbitration commissioners have also noted the importance of the tribunals for efficiency and equity (Hancock, 1985; Isaac, 1982) . They argue that the tribunals play an important role in rectifying labour inefficiencies and inequalities such as unfairness in male-female earnings relativities. (Isaac, 1990; Green & MacDonald, 1991) . The Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (AWIRS)' indicated the degree of flexibility and diversity at workplaces operating within the award system. Indeed, in terms of payment systems, 52 per cent of workplaces with twenty or more employees paid over-award rates, and nearly onethird (32 per cent) of workplaces operated performance-related payment schemes. Profit-sharing schemes (8 per cent) and share ownership schemes (13 percent) were rare, but were still possible under the regulatory system. It would seem that the incidence of these 'flexible' payment schemes has more to do with management and employee attitudes than with any prohibition or difficulty arising from the external regulatory system. ' Historically, the external regulatory system has preserved management's prerogatives against the encroachment of union demands over a range of issues (see, for example, Sorrell, 1979 (Callus, 1992) .
There is reason to believe that the alleged negative effects of the external regulatory system have been overestimated. Indeed, it appears that organizations may be more influenced by management culture, product market conditions and management initiated 'restructures' than by the (Schultz,1985; Villa, 1986; Marsden, 1986; Kaufman, 1988; Kruger & Summers, 1988; Groschen, 1991) .
The labour market, far from being a potential clustering of harmony and order arising from free choices made by isolated individuals, is in fact highly structured. Segments of the workforce do not compete with each other for jobs. Instead, the workforce is divided into myriad groups on the basis of industry, firm or enterprise and occupation. The precise nature of segmentation in any one sector of the economy varies on the basis of production technology, industrial structure and product market conditions. Within these constraints the results of strategies pursued by employers, employees, unions and state agencies also influence the nature of labour market segmentation (see Villa, 1986 and Groschen, 1991) .
The importance of rules made outside the workplace has often been neglected or overlooked by those advocating workplace change and managed decentralization of the current system. Their concentration on organizational performance, workplace change and enterprise bargaining has meant that little attention has been given to examining and improving the structure of the current institutional environment. Given the nature of labour market structures, it is obvious that many equity and efficiency problems cannot be solved on a workplace-by-workplace or enterpriseby-enterprise basis. The problems involve practices and arrangements that are common to many business units. They require strategies involving external modes of regulation that promote consistent standards across business units.
For example, if the importance of the external regulatory environment is reduced, the results of workplace bargaining will depend largely on the relative power of the parties. The market mechanism or even workplace bargaining under such a system cannot ensure that results are equitable or fair; those parties with most bargaining power will do best. If fairness is to remain an important consideration in evaluating the operation of our industrial relations system, externally generated rules that are applied to all organizations may be the only way of guaranteeing it.
Additional benefits of external methods of regulation can be shown by considering a number of problems that regularly occur in the labour market. These range from macroeconomic issues, such as unemployment, to microeconomic issues, such as training and labour mobility, and longstanding equity issues, such a male-female wage relativities.
The problem of unemployment is a recurring one. While it is important to acknowledge that labour market factors are not the only factors having a bearing on it, they do have some effect. As Soskice (1990) (Katz & Krueger, 1992; Card & Krueger, 1993; Dickens, Machin & Manning, 1993) These studies raise serious questions for those economists who believe that formal labour market regulation only causes higher levels of unemployment (such as Anderson & Blandy, 1993) .
The issue of relative pay is another recurring cause of concern in the labour market. 'Free market deregulationists' have argued that wages should only be related to internal factors, such as individual performance and the enterprise's capacity to pay. However, the maintenance of consistent wage standards across workplaces for workers in similar occupations has important efficiency and equity benefits. As long ago as the 1930s the American labour economist Paul Douglas noted that it was unhelpful to link an individual's pay to her or his productivity (Douglas, 1934 , cited in McNulty, 1980 ; see also Oswald, 1992) . For example, if wages were strictly linked to productivity the pay of labourers in industries with slow productivity growth (e.g. road maintenance workers) would drop significantly relative to those where productivity growth was strong (e.g. process workers in chemical manufacturing). Over time no one would apply for jobs in road maintenance and there would be an oversupply of applicants for positions in the chemicals sector. Such a wage system would also reduce the profits available for further investment arising from productivity growth. Relating wages to internal factors encourages neither efficient labour allocation nor investment. It is far more efficient to have a stable relative wage structure that is based on skill content and quality of labour rather than the luck of where a worker is placed in the economy as far as productivity growth is concerned. Externally agreed benchmarks for pay (such as award rates or industry-wide industrial agreements) help maintain stability in the labour market and prevent inefficient movements in wages and workers that would arise with enterprise-based wage arrangements.
A related issue is occupational mobility and the transferability of skills. Major efficiency gains can result from multi-employer training arrangements underpinning common occupational structures that are used by a range of employers. The benefits of such arrangements have been identified by a number of studies (Daley, Hitchens & Wagner, 1985; Wagner, 1987 and Prais, Jarvis & Wagner, 1989) . A comprehensive study of German and French manufacturing involved comparing the performance of a series of factories of similar size and production technology in the two countries' chemicals and metals industries (Maurice, Sellier & Silvestre, 1984 (Higgins, 1922) . He saw no reason why employees should subsidize the inefficiencies of their employers. The rationale was that wages policy should assist in determining the structure of the economy by preventing the emergence of a low-wage sector.' One of the legacies of the conservative governments of the 1980s in the United Kingdom and the United States appears to be the establishment and growth of such low-wage sectors (Brosnan & Wilkinson, 1988; Harrison & Bluestone, 1988; Bluestone & Harrison, 1990 ).
The equity implications of external regulation can be seen in the case of u·ojnen's pay. It is recognized among labour economists that Australia achieved one of the most comprehensive and rapid changes in male-female earnings ratios in the world because of the very extensive nature of Australia's labour market regulatory institutions (Gregvry & Duncan, 1981; Whitehouse, 1990 (Standing, 199I, p. 34 ).
Similar sentiments have been expressed by Streck. He has argued that preoccupation with enterprise issues can result in the emergence of 'islands of excellence' in a sea of mediocrity (Streeck, 1989, p. 94 and Elam, 1993, p. 22 (Streeck, 1992, p. 29) . A comprehensive consideration of issues related to these matters has been undertaken by Paul Osterman (1988) (Osterman, 1988, pp. 149-ski) .
Such proposals would obviously involve the better linking of internal and external modes of regulation.
Recent research on industry development and parts of the management literature have also highlighted the importance of linkages between firms as a factor contributing to their collective competitive success (Pettigrew & Whipp, 1991 
Conclusion
Equity and efficiency at work are vital issues affecting both the creation of national wealth and the quality of working life. To date, both academic and policy debate has been preoccupied with the issues of 'deregulation' or reducing the role of external regulation and improving workplace performance. Little attention has been given to the important role of external modes of regulation. To this extent, we would argue, the policy debate has been partial and misdirected.
The fact that the industrial relations policy debate has been cast as a choice between regulation and deregulation in part reflects the dominant role economists have played in this process. The laissez-faire economists who saw the necessity for 'deregulating' the finance market in the 1980s took the next logical step and began focusing on the 'need' to 'deregulate' the labour market (Kelly, 1992) . Why the industrial relations research community, which has had a longstanding interest in the modes of labour market regulation, has been so marginalized in this debate is unclear. It may, in part, reflect the preoccupation among many industrial relations researchers with documenting changes that are occurring within a framework set by the policy initiatives of the labour movement and the federal government.
External forms of regulation have a vital contribution to make in improving equity and efficiency at the workplace. Implementation of 'deregulation' as it is popularly perceived would simply result in internal modes of regulation (usually only involving management) becoming the dominant form of rule making. This appears to have been the experience in the United States and the United Kingdom (Harrison & Bluestone, 1988; Bray, 1993; Archer, 1993) If we are to achieve the twin objectives of improving efficiency and equity the central issue must be: how is an appropriate balance to be struck between internal and external forms of regulation? Calls for the total dismantling of the external formal mechanisms of regulation would exacerbate, not resolve, our labour market problems. Concentrating solely on workplace reform and enterprise bargaining will only segment the labour market even further. If labour market reforms are to make a positive contribution to improved efficiency and equity within Australia, current regulatory arrangements should be improved so that there are better linkages between internal and external forms of regulation. 
